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We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of
anonymous communication in the Universally Composable framework that abstracts the essential properties
of onion routing in the presence of an active adversary that controls a portion of the network and knows all
a priori distributions on user choices of destination. Our results quantify how much the adversary can gain
in identifying users by exploiting knowledge of their probabilistic behavior. In particular, we show that, in
the limit as the network gets large, a user u’s anonymity is worst either when the other users always choose
the destination u is least likely to visit or when the other users always choose the destination u chooses. This
worst-case anonymity with an adversary that controls a fraction b of the routers is shown to be comparable
to the best-case anonymity against an adversary that controls a fraction
√
b.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—security
and protection; C.2.4 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems—Distributed appli-
cations; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—privacy; G.3 [Probability and Statistics]:
probabilistic algorithms
General Terms: Security, Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: anonymous communication, onion routing, Tor
1. INTRODUCTION
Every day, half a million people use the onion-routing network
Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004] to anonymize their Internet communication. However, the
effectiveness of this service, and of onion routing in general, is not well understood.
The approach we take to this problem is to model onion routing formally all the way
from the protocol details to the behavior of the users. We then analyze the resulting
system and quantify the anonymity it provides. Key features of our model include i) a
black-box abstraction in the Universally Composable (UC) framework [Canetti 2000]
that hides the underlying operation of the protocol and ii) probabilistic user behavior
and protocol operation.
Systems for communication anonymity generally have at most one of two desirable
properties: provable security and practicality. Systems that one can prove secure have
used assumptions that make them impractical for most communication applications.
Practical systems are ultimately the ones we must care about, because they are the
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ones that will actually be used. However, their security properties have not been rig-
orously analyzed or even fully stated. This is no surprise, because practical anonymity
systems have been deployed and available to study for perhaps a decade, while prac-
tical systems for communications confidentiality and/or authenticity have been in use
almost as long as there have been electronic communications. It often takes a while for
theory and practice to catch up to each other.
Of the many anonymous-communication design proposals (e.g.
[Chaum 1981; Chaum 1988; Reiter and Rubin 1998; Beimel and Dolev 2003;
Nambiar and Wright 2006; Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford 2010]), onion routing
[Goldschlag et al. 1996] has had notable success in practice. Several implementations
have been made [Goldschlag et al. 1996; Syverson et al. 2000; Dingledine et al. 2004],
and there was a similar commercial system, Freedom [Goldberg and Shostack 2001].
As of October 2011, Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004], the most recent iteration of the basic
design, consists of about 3000 routers, provides a total bandwidth of over 1000 MB/s,
and has an estimated total user population of about 500,000 [Loesing et al. 2011].
Because of this popularity, we believe it is important to improve our understanding of
the protocol.
Onion routing is a practical anonymity-network scheme with relatively low overhead
and latency. Users use a dedicated set of onion routers to forward their traffic, obscur-
ing the relationship between themselves and their destinations. To communicate with
a destination, a user selects a sequence of onion routers and constructs a circuit, or per-
sistant connection, over that sequence. Messages to and from the destination are sent
over the circuit. Onion routing provides two-way, connection-based communication and
does not require that the destination participate in the anonymity-network protocol.
These features make it useful for anonymizing much of the communication that takes
place over the Internet today, such as web browsing, chatting, and remote login. Thus,
formal analysis and provable anonymity results for onion routing are significant.
As a step toward the overall goal of bridging the gap between provability and practi-
cality in anonymous-communication systems, we have formally modeled and analyzed
relationship anonymity [Pfitzmann and Hansen 2000; Shmatikov and Wang 2006] in
Tor. Although this provides just a small part of the complete understanding of prac-
tical anonymity at which our research program is aimed, already it yields nontrivial
results that require delicate probabilistic analysis. We hope that this aspect of the
work will spur the Theoretical Computer Science community to devote the same level
of attention to the rigorous study of anonymity as it has to the rigorous study of confi-
dentiality.
1.1. Summary of Contributions
Black-box abstraction: In the present paper, we treat the network simply as a “black
box”1 to which users connect and through which they communicate with destinations.
The abstraction captures the relevant properties of a protocol execution that the ad-
versary can infer from his observations - namely, the observed users, the observed
destinations, and the possible connections between the two. In this way, we abstract
away from much of the design specific to onion routing so that our results apply both
to onion routing and to other low-latency anonymous-communication designs. We ex-
press the black-box model within the Universally Composable (UC) security frame-
work [Canetti 2000], which is a standard way to express the function and security
1We note that our use of a “black box” is slightly different than the more common uses in the literature.
Black-box access to some cryptographic primitives is commonly used as a starting point to achieve some
other desired functionality. Here we show how, for purposes of anonymity analysis, we need only consider a
black-box abstraction.
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properties of cryptographic protocols. We tie our functionality to the guarantees of an
actual protocol by showing it reveals as much information about users’ communica-
tion as the onion routing protocol we formalized [Feigenbaum et al. 2007] in an I/O-
automata model. Moreover, we discuss how the functionality might be emulated by a
protocol within the UC framework itself.
Probabilistic model: Our previous analysis in the I/O-automata model was pos-
sibilistic, a notion of anonymity that is simply not sensitive enough. It makes no dis-
tinction between communication that is equally likely to be from any one of a hundred
senders and communication that came from one sender with probability .99 and from
each of the other 99 senders with probability .000101. An adversary in the real world
is likely to have information about which scenarios are more realistic than others. In
particular, users’ communication patterns are not totally random. When the adversary
can determine with high probability, e.g., the sender of a message, that sender is not
anonymous in a meaningful way.
Using this intuition, we include a probability measure in our black-box model. For
any set of actual sources and destinations, there is a larger set that is consistent with
the observations made by an adversary. The adversary can then infer conditional prob-
abilities on this larger set using the measure. This gives the adversary probabilistic
information about the facts we want the network to hide, such as the initiator of a
communication.
In the probability measure that we use, each user chooses a destination according to
some probability distribution. We model heterogeneous user behavior by allowing this
distribution to be different for different users. We also assume that the users choose
their circuits by selecting the routers on it independently and at random.
After observing the protocol, the adversary can in principle infer some distribution
on circuit source and destination. He may not actually know the underlying probabil-
ity measure, however. In particular, it doesn’t seem likely that the adversary would
know how every user selects destinations. In our analysis, we take a worst-case view
and assume that the adversary knows the distributions exactly. Also, over time he
might learn a good approximation of user behavior via the long-term intersection at-
tack [Danezis and Serjantov 2004]. In this case, it may seem as though anonymity has
been essentially lost anyway. However, even when the adversary knows how a user
generally behaves, the anonymity network may make it hard for him to determine
who is responsible for any specific action, and the anonymity of a specific action is
what we are interested in.
Anonymity metric: We analyze relationship anonymity
[Pfitzmann and Hansen 2000; Shmatikov and Wang 2006] in our onion routing
model. Relationship anonymity is obtained when the adversary cannot identify the
destination of a user. In terms of the conventional subject/action specification for
anonymity [Pfitzmann and Hansen 2000], we can take the action to be communication
from a given user u and the subject to be the destination. Suggested probabilistic
metrics for anonymity applied to this case include probability assigned to the correct
destination [Reiter and Rubin 1998], the entropy of the destination distribution
[Dı´az et al. 2002; Serjantov and Danezis 2002], and maximum probability within the
destination distribution [To´th et al. 2004], where the distribution in each case is a con-
ditional distribution given the adversary’s view. We will use the probability assigned
to the correct destination as our metric. In part, this is because it is the simplest
metric. Also, any statements about entropy and maximum probability metrics only
make loose guarantees about the probability assigned to the actual subject, a quantity
that clearly seems important to the individual users.
We look at the value of this anonymity metric for a choice of destination by a user.
Fixing a destination by just one user, say u, does not determine what the adversary
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sees, however. The adversary’s observations are also affected by the destinations cho-
sen by the other users and the circuits chosen by everybody. Because those variables
are chosen probabilistically under the measure we added, the anonymity metric will
have its own distribution. Several statistics about this distribution might be interest-
ing; in this paper, we look at its expectation. Unlike other common anonymity metrics,
our approach lets a user judge how secure he can expect a specific communication
activity to be and thus whether to do it or not.
Bounds on Anonymity:
The distribution of the anonymity metric for a given user and destination depends
on the other users’ destination distributions. If their distributions are very different
from that of the given user, the adversary may have an easy time separating out the
actions of the user. If they are similar, the user may more effectively hide in the crowd.
We provide the following results on a user’s anonymity and its dependence on other
user behavior:
(1) We show that a standard approximation to our metric provides a lower bound on
it (Thm. 3.3).
(2) We show that the worst case for anonymity over other users’ behavior is when
every other user either always visits the destinations the user is otherwise least
likely to visit or always visits his actual destination (Cor. 3.7). The former will be
the worst case in most situations.
(3) We give an asymptotic expression for our metric in the worst cases (Thm. 3.6). The
limit of this expression in the most common worst case with an adversary control-
ling a fraction b of the network is equal to the lower bound on the metric when the
adversary controls a larger fraction
√
b of the network. This is significantly worse
than the standard analysis suggested, and shows the importance of carefully con-
sidering the adversary’s knowledge of the system.
(4) We consider anonymity in a more typical set of user distributions in which each
user selects a destination from a common Zipfian distribution. Because the users
are identical, every user hides well among the others, and we show that, as the
user population grows, the anonymity approaches the lower bound (Thm. 4). This
shows you may be able to use the standard approximation with accurate results if
you are able to make assumptions about user behavior.
1.2. Related Work
Ours is not the first formalization of anonymous communication. Early formaliza-
tions used communicating sequential processes [Schneider and Sidiropoulos 1996],
graph theory and possible worlds [Hughes and Shmatikov 2004], and epistemic
logic [Syverson and Stubblebine 1999; Halpern and O’Neill 2005]. These works fo-
cused primarily on formalizing the high-level concept of anonymity in communi-
cation. For this reason, they applied their formalisms to toy examples or sys-
tems that are of limited practical application and can only provide very strong
forms of anonymity, e.g., dining-cryptographers networks. Also, with the exception of
Halpern and O’Neill [2005], they have at most a limited ability to represent probability
and probabilistic reasoning. We have focused in Feigenbaum et al. [2007] on formaliz-
ing a widely deployed and used, practical, low-latency system.
Halpern and O’Neill [2005] give a general formulation of anonymity in systems that
applies to our model. They describe a “runs-and-systems” framework that provides
semantics for logical statements about systems. They then give several logical defini-
tions for varieties of anonymity. It is straightforward to apply this framework to the
network model and protocol that we give in [Feigenbaum et al. 2007]. Our possibilistic
definitions of sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, and relationship anonymity then
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correspond to the notion of “minimal anonymity” as defined in their paper. The other
notions of anonymity they give are generally too strong and are not achieved in our
model of onion routing.
Later formalizations of substantial anonymous communication sys-
tems [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005; Mauw et al. 2004; Wikstro¨m 2004] have
not been directly based on the design of deployed systems and have focused on prov-
ability without specific regard for applicability to an implemented or implementable
design. Also, results in these papers are for message-based systems: each message is
constructed to be processed as a self-contained unit by the appropriate router, typically
using the generally available public encryption key for that router. Such systems
typically employ mixing, changing the appearance and decoupling the ordering of
input to output messages at the router to produce anonymity locally [Chaum 1981].
Onion routing, on the other hand, is circuit based: before passing any messages with
user content, onion routing first lays a circuit through the routers that provides
those routers the keys to be used in processing the actual messages. Mixing can
be combined with onion routing in various ways [Reed et al. 1998], although this
is not typical [Dingledine et al. 2004]. Such circuit creation facilitates bidirectional,
low-latency coommunication and has been an identifying feature of onion routing since
the first public use of the phrase [Goldschlag et al. 1996]. Thus, while illuminating
and important works on anonymous communication, the formalizations above are
not likely to be applicable to low-latency communications, and, despite the title of
[Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005], are not analyses of onion routing.
In this paper, we add probabilistic analysis to the framework of
Feigenbaum et al. [2007]. Other works have presented probabilistic analysis of anony-
mous communication [Reiter and Rubin 1998; Shmatikov 2004; Wright et al. 2004;
Danezis 2003; Danezis and Serjantov 2004; Mathewson and Dingledine 2004;
Kesdogan et al. 1998] and even of onion routing [Syverson et al. 2000]. The work
of Shmatikov and Wang [2006] is particularly similar to ours. It calculates relation-
ship anonymity in mix networks and incorporates user distributions for selecting
destinations. However, with the exception of [Shmatikov 2004], these have not been
formal analyses. Also, whether for high-latency systems such as mix networks, or
low-latency systems, such as Crowds and onion routing, many of the attacks in
these papers are some form of intersection attack. In an intersection attack, one
watches repeated communication events for patterns of senders and receivers over
time. Unless all senders are on and sending all the time (in a way not selectively
blockable by an adversary) and/or all receivers receiving all the time, if different
senders have different receiving partners, there will be patterns that arise and
eventually differentiate the communication partners. It has long been recognized
that no system design is secure against a long-term intersection attack. Several
of these papers set out frameworks for making that more precise. In particular,
[Danezis 2003], [Danezis and Serjantov 2004], and [Mathewson and Dingledine 2004]
constitute a progression towards quantifying how long it takes (in practice) to reveal
traffic patterns in realistic settings.
We are not concerned herein with intersection attacks. We are effectively as-
suming that the intersection attack is done. The adversary already has a cor-
rect distribution of a user’s communication partners. We are investigating the
anonymity of a communication in which a user communicates with one of those part-
ners in the distribution. This follows the anonymity analyses performed in much
of the literature [Kesdogan et al. 1998; Mauw et al. 2004; Reiter and Rubin 1998;
Syverson et al. 2000], which focus on finding the source and destination of an individ-
ual communication. Our analysis differs in that we take into account the probabilistic
nature of the users’ behavior.
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We expect this to have potential practical applications. For example, designs
for shared security-alert repositories to facilitate both forensic analysis for im-
proved security design and quicker responses to widescale attacks have been pro-
posed [Lincoln et al. 2004]. A participant in a shared security-alert repository might
expect to be known to communicate with it on a regular basis. Assuming reports of
intrusions, etc., are adequately sanitized, the concern of the participant should be to
hide when it is that updates from that participant arrive at the repository, i.e., which
updates are likely to be from that participant as opposed to others.
2. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Model
We describe our analysis of onion routing in terms of an ideal functionality in the
Universal Composability framework [Canetti 2000] We use such a functionality for
three reasons: First, it abstracts away the details that aren’t relevant to anonymity,
second, it precisely expresses the cryptographic protocol properties that are necessary
for our analysis to apply, and third, it immediately suggests ways to perform similar
analyses of other anonymous-communication protocols that may not strictly provide
this functionality.
In the onion routing protocol on which we base our model, users choose from a gener-
ally known set of onion routers a subset that will comprise a circuit for communicating
anonymously. Circuit construction has been done in various ways throughout the his-
tory of onion routing. In the first version of onion routing [Goldschlag et al. 1996], and
other early versions [Reed et al. 1998; Goldberg and Shostack 2001], after a user se-
lects a sequence of onion routers from a publicly-known set, the user then creates a cir-
cuit through this sequence using an onion, a data structure effectively composed only of
layers with nothing in the middle. There is one public-key-encrypted layer for each hop
in the circuit, the decryption of which contains the identity of the next hop in the circuit
(if there is one) and keying material for passing data over the established circuit. In
later protocols, such as used in Cebolla [Brown 2002] and Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004],
the circuit is built via a telescoping protocol that extends the circuit hop-by-hop, using
the existing circuit for each extension. For all of these, each hop only communicates
with the routers before and after it in the sequence, and the messages are encrypted
once for each router in the circuit so that no additional information leaks about the
identities of the other routers or the destination of the circuit. Cryptographic tech-
niques are used so that message forgery is countered. Some later designs returned
to the non-interactive circuit construction of the original [Øverlier and Syverson 2007;
Kate et al. 2007]. It is trivial to see that all of these fit directly within our model.
Some versions of onion routing, such as those that do iterative discovery
of onion routers via a DHT [Freedman and Morris 2002; Mittal and Borisov 2009;
McLachlan et al. 2009], will not fit within our model without some extensions that
we do not pursue herein. This is because the probability of first-last router choice and
router compromise within a circuit can no longer be assumed to be independent. Some
anonymity protocols that do not use onion routing may nonetheless also fit within our
model, appropriately extended. For example, in Crowds [Reiter and Rubin 1998], the
adversary can learn from observing the first and last routers, but the connection to the
first router does not automatically identify the source. On the other hand the desti-
nation is always know to every router in the circuit. The probability that an observed
circuit predecessor is the source can thus be combined with the observed destination
and the a priori source-destination probability distribution.
The adversary is computationally bounded, non-adaptively compromises an un-
known subset of the onion routers, and can actively attack the protocol. The design
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of our functionality is based on the assumption that the ways that the adversary can
narrow down the possible mappings of users to destinations is determined by the set of
circuits for which he controls the first router and the set of circuits for which he controls
the last router. This assumption comes from the results of Feigenbaum et al. [2007],
which we explicitly relate to our ideal functionality in Sec. 2.4.
Our ideal functionality models anonymous communication over some period of time.
It takes as input from each user the identity of a destination. For every such connection
between a user and destination, the functionality may reveal to the adversary identity
of the user, the identity of the destination, or both. Revealing the user corresponds in
onion routing to the first router in the circuit being compromised, and revealing the
destination corresponds to the last router being compromised. We note that we include
only information flow to the adversary in this functionality rather than try to cap-
ture the type of communication primitive offered by onion routing because our focus is
analyzing anonymity rather than defining a useful anonymous-communication func-
tionality. This model is reminiscent of the general model of anonymous communication
used by Kesdogan et al. [2002] in their analysis of an intersection attack. However, we
do make a few assumptions that are particularly appropriate for onion routing.
First, the functionality allows the adversary to know whether or not he has directly
observed the user. This is valid under the assumption that the initiating client is not
located at an onion router itself. This is the case for the vast majority of circuits in Tor
and in all significant deployments of onion routing and similar systems to date. We
discuss this assumption further in Section 5.
Second, we assume that every user is responsible for exactly one connection in a
round. Certainly users can communicate with multiple destinations simultaneously
in actual onion-routing systems. However, it seems likely that in practice most users
have at most some small (and fixed-bound) number of active connections at any time.
To the extent that multiple connections are only slightly more likely to be from the
same user than if all connections were independentlymade and identically distributed,
this is a reasonable approximation. This is increasingly true as the overall number of
connections grows. To the extent that multiple connections are less likely to be from
the same user this is a conservative assumption that gives the adversary as much
power to break anonymity as the limited number of user circuits can provide.
Third, the functionality omits the possibility that the adversary observes the user
and destination but does not recognize that those observations are part of the some
connection. This is another conservative assumption that is motivated by the exis-
tence of timing attacks that an active adversary can use to link traffic that it sees at
various points along its path through the network [Syverson et al. 2000]. In a timing
attack, the adversary observes the timing of the messages going into the onion-routing
network and matches them to similar patterns of messages coming out of the onion-
routing networks slightly later. Such attacks have been experimentally demonstrated
[Øverlier and Syverson 2006; Bauer et al. 2007] and are easy to mount.
Note that our model does not capture several known attacks on anonymity in
onion routing. In particular, it does not include attacks exploiting resource interfer-
ence [Murdoch and Danezis 2005; Murdoch 2006], heterogeneity on network latency
[Hopper et al. 2010], correlated destinations between rounds, and identifying patterns
of communication [Herrmann et al. 2009]. We do not include such attacks primarily
to focus on the most important threats to anonymity, because many of the omitted
attacks are attacks on underlying systems rather than on the protocol (e.g., interfer-
ence) or have limited effectiveness or are mitigated by improvements to the protocol.
Also, we see the analysis of our simplified model as a first step in establishing rigorous
guarantees of anonymity in increasingly realistic models.
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Let U be the set of users with |U | = n. Let ∆ be the set of destinations. Let R
be the set of onion routers. Let FOR be the ideal functionality. FOR takes the set A of
compromised parties from the adversary at the beginning of the execution. Let b = |A∩
R|/|R|. When user u forwards his input from the environment to FOR, the functionality
checks to see if it is some d ∈ ∆. If so, FOR sends to the adversary one of the following,
choosing each with the probability given:
(1) (⊥,⊥) with probability (1− b)2
(2) (u,⊥) with probability b(1− b)
(3) (⊥, d) with probability (1− b)b
(4) (u, d) with probability b2.
To analyze the anonymity provided by the ideal functionality, we make two assump-
tions about the inputs from the environment. First, we assume that the environment
selects the destination of user u from a distribution pu over ∆, where we denote the
probability that u chooses d as pud . Second, we assume that the environment sends a
destination to each user. Note that these assumptions need not be made when showing
that a protocol UC-emulates FOR.
We refer to the combination of the adversary model, the assumptions about the en-
vironment, and the ideal functionality as the black-box model. Let C be the relevant
configuration resulting from an execution. C includes a selection of a destination by
each user, CD : U → ∆, a set of users whose inputs are observed, CI : U → {0, 1}, and
a set of users whose outputs are observed, CO : U → {0, 1}. A user’s input, output, and
destination will be called its circuit.
For any configuration, there is a larger set of configurations that are consistent with
the outputs that the adversary receives from FOR. We will call two configurations in-
distinguishable if the sets of inputs, outputs, and links between them that the adver-
sary receives are the same. We use the notation C ≈ C to indicate that configurations
C and C are indistinguishable.
2.2. Probabilistic Anonymity
A user performs an action anonymously in a possibilistic sense if there is an indistin-
guishable configuration in which the user does not perform the action. For example,
under this definition a user with observed output but unobserved input sends that out-
put anonymously if there exists another user with unobserved input. The probability
measure we have added to configurations allows us to incorporate the degree of cer-
tainty that the adversary has about the subject of an action. After making observations
in the actual configuration, the adversary can infer a conditional probability distribu-
tion on configurations. There are several candidates in the literature for assessing
an anonymity metric from this distribution. The probabilistic anonymity metric that
we use is the posterior probability of the correct subject. The lower this is, the more
anonymous we consider the user.
2.3. Relationship Anonymity
We analyze the relationship anonymity of users and destinations in our model, that is,
how well the adversary can determine if a user and destination have communicated.
Our metric for the relationship anonymity of user u and destination d is the posterior
probability ψ that u chooses d as his destination. We study ψ directly, although the
anonymity of a user’s communication with a destination is 1− ψ.
Using the posterior probability makes sense in this context because it focuses on the
information that users are trying to hide—their actual destinations—without being
affected by information the adversary learns about other destinations. Onion routing
does leak information, and using a metric such as the entropy of the posterior distribu-
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tion or the statistical distance from the prior may not give a good idea of how well the
adversary’s can correctly guess the user’s behavior. Designers may wish to know how
well a system protects communications on average or overall. But it is also important
for a user to be able to assess how secure he can expect a particular communication
to be in order to decide whether to create it or not. This is the question we address.
Moreover, the metric is relatively simple to analyze. Furthermore, to the extent that
the user may not know how he fits in and thus wishes to know the worst risk for any
user, that is just a lower bound on our metric.
The relationship anonymity of u and d varies with the destination choices of the
other users and the observations of the adversary. If, for example, u’s output is ob-
served, and the inputs of all other users are observed, then the adversary knows
u’s destination with probability 1. Because we want to examine the relationship
anonymity of u conditioned only on his destination, we end up with a distribution
on the anonymity metric. We look at the expectation of this distribution. Moreover,
because this distribution depends on the destination distributions of all of the users,
we continue by finding the worst-case expectation in the limit for a given user and
destination and then examine the expectation in a more likely situation.
2.4. Emulating the Ideal Functionality
The anonymity analysis of the ideal functionality FOR that we perform in Sections 3
and 4 is meaningful to the extent that FOR captures the information that an adver-
sary can obtain by interacting with onion-routing protocols. We justify the functional-
ity primarily by showing that it provides the same information about the source of a
given connection as onion-routing as formalized by Feigenbaum et al. [2007]. Further-
more, towards a more standard cryptographic analysis, we describe the way in which it
should be possible to UC-emulate FOR, although we do not provide such a result here.
Relationship to I/O-automata model Feigenbaum et al. [2007] formalize onion
routing using an I/O-automata model[Lynch 1996] and an idealization of the crypto-
graphic properties of the protocol. Their analysis identifies the user states that are
information-theoretically indistinguishable. The black-box model we provide herein is
a valid abstraction of that formalization because, under some reasonable probability
measures on executions, it preserves the relationship-anonymity properties.
The I/O-automata model includes a set of users U , a set of routers R, an adversary
A ⊆ R, and a set of destinations ∆, where we take the final router in the I/O-automata
model to be the destination and assume that it is uncompromised. A configuration C in
the I/O-automatamodel is a mapping from each user u ∈ U to a circuit (ru1 , . . . , rul ) ∈ Rl,
a destination du ∈ ∆, and a circuit identifier nu ∈ N+. An execution is a sequence of
I/O-automaton states and actions, which must be consistent with the configuration.
Let users in the I/O-automata model choose the other routers in their circuits uni-
formly at random and choose the destination according to user-specific distributions.
Given these circuits and a set of adversary automata, Feigenbaum et al. [2007] iden-
tifies an equivalence class of circuit and destination choices such that, for every pair
of configurations in the class, a bijection exists between their executions such that
paired executions are indistinguishable. Let the indistinguishable executions thus
paired have the same probability, conditional on their configuration.
Given this measure, the black-box model that abstracts the I/O-automata model has
the same user set U , the same destination set∆, an adversary parameter of b = |A|/|R|,
and the same destination distributions. The following theorem shows that each pos-
terior distribution on the destinations of users has the same probability under both
the I/O-automata model and its black-box model. Let E be a random I/O-automata
execution. Let Xa be a random I/O-automata configuration (Xa can be viewed as a
function mapping a random execution to its configuration). Let Xb be a random black-
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box configuration. Let ψ1(u, d, E) be the posterior probability that u visited d in the
I/O-automata model, i.e., the conditional given that the execution is indistinguishable
from E. Let ψ2(u, d,X
b) be the posterior probability that u visited d in the black-box
model, i.e., the conditional distribution given that the configuration is indistinguish-
able from Xb. Let ψ0(u, d) be a distribution over destinations d for every u.
THEOREM 2.1.
Pr[∀u∈U,d∈∆ψ1(u, d, E) = ψ0(u, d)] = Pr[∀u∈U,d∈∆ψ2(u, d,Xb) = ψ0(u, d)]
PROOF. Let φ be the map from I/O-automata configurations to black-box configura-
tions such that
(1) φ(C)D(u) = d
u
(2) φ(C)I(u) =
{
1 if r1 ∈ A
0 otherwise
(3) φ(C)O(u) =
{
1 if rl ∈ A
0 otherwise
.
φ essentially “quotients out” the specific router choices of each user, retaining the com-
promised status of the first and last routers as well as the destination. It allows us to
relate the posterior ψ1 in the I/O-automata model to the ψ2 in the black-box model.
Let Ca1 be any I/O-automata configuration. Given any execution e of C
a
1 , the adver-
sary’s posterior probability on configurations is
Pr[Xa = Ca2 ]∑
Ca≈Ca1 Pr[X
a = Ca]
if Ca2 ≈ Ca1 and 0 otherwise, because we set equal the probability of two execu-
tions that are paired with each other in the bijection on executions constructed
in Feigenbaum et al. [2007]. Because the configurations determine which destination
each user visits, the distribution ψ1(u, d, e) can be determined from the posterior dis-
tribution on configurations. Notice that this distribution only puts positive probability
on the set Ca of configurations that are indistinguishable from Ca1 .
The posterior distribution on I/O-automata configurations induces a posterior distri-
bution on black-box configurations via φ. φ preserves the destination of each user, and
so the distribution ψ1(u, d, e) can be determined from this distribution on black-box
configurations. Notice that this distribution only puts positive probability on the set of
black-box configurations φ(Ca) that are mapped to by I/O-automata configurations in
Ca.
To understand the set φ(Ca) and its posterior distribution given e, consider the equiv-
alence class Cb of the configuration φ(Ca1 ). Let S be those configurations in Ca that differ
from Ca1 only in the destinations and the permutation of users. From Theorems 1 and 2
in Feigenbaum et al. [2007], it follows that φ is a bijection between S and Cb. The pos-
terior probability of each Ca2 ∈ S is proportional to Pr[Xb = φ(Ca2 )] because the prior
probability of Ca2 is Pr[X
b = φ(Ca2 )] multiplied by the probability selecting its given
routers (which are the same for all s ∈ S) given that φ(Xa) = φ(Ca2 ). Moreover, all of
the other configurations in Ca are reached by changing the unobserved routers of one
of the configurations in S. φ is invariant under such a change. Also, the posterior prob-
ability is invariant under such a change because the routers are chosen independently
and uniformly at random. Furthermore, the number of I/O-automata configurations
that are reached by such a change from some s ∈ S is the same for all s. Therefore, the
posterior probability Pr[φ(Xa) = Cb|e] is proportional to Pr[Xb = Cb] for Cb ∈ Cb, and
is zero otherwise. Therefore, ψ1(u, d, e) = ψ2(u, d, φ(C
a
1 )).
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By this equality, the probability that a random execution E results in a given poste-
rior ψ0(u, d) is equal to the probability that the I/O-automata configuration X
a maps
under φ to a black-box configuration φ(Xa) = Cb such that ψ2(u, d, C
b) = ψ0(u, d).
The probability Pr[φ(Xa) = Cb] is equal to Pr[Xb = Cb] because the probability of
first-router compromise and the probability of an input being observed are both b, last-
router compromise and an output being observed are both independent events with
probability b, and user destinations are chosen independently in both models and fol-
low the same distributions. Therefore,
Pr[∀u∈U,d∈∆ψ1(u, d, E) = ψ0(u, d)] = Pr[∀u∈U,d∈∆ψ2(u, d,X) = ψ0(u, d)].
UC-emulation Expressing our black-box model within the UC framework allows
it to be compared to protocols expressed within the same framework. In particular,
if a protocol can be shown to UC-emulate FOR, then, making only common crypto-
graphic assumptions, the adversary can make only negligibly better guesses about
users’ communication when interacting with that protocol than he can with the func-
tionality. The results of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] suggest that such emula-
tion is indeed possible. An onion routing protocol similar to their protocol combined
with a message transmission functionality that hides messages not to corrupt parties
(cf. Canetti [2000]), should indeed hide the routers that are not corrupt or next to cor-
rupt routers on a circuit. Then FOR provides the adversary with all the information
about user inputs that a simulator needs in order to simulate the rest of the protocol
and confuse the adversary.
3. EXPECTED ANONYMITY
Let the set C of all configurations be the sample space and X be a random configura-
tion. Let Ψ be the posterior probability of the event that u chooses d as a destination,
that is, Ψ(C) = Pr[XD(u) = d|X ≈ C]. Ψ is our metric for the relationship anonymity
of u and d.
Let N∆ represent the set of multisets over ∆. Let ρ(∆0) be the maximum number of
orderings of ∆0 ∈ N∆ such that the same destination is in any given location in every
ordering:
ρ(∆0) =
∏
δ∈∆
|{δ ∈ ∆0}|!
Let Π(A,B) be the set of all injective maps A → B. The following theorem gives
an exact expression for the conditional expectation of Ψ in terms of the underlying
parameters U , ∆, p, and b:
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THEOREM 3.1.
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+∑
S⊆U :u∈S
∑
∆0∈N∆:|∆0|≤S
bn−|S|+|∆
0|(1 − b)2|S|−|∆0|·

 ∑
T⊆S−u:|T |=|∆0|−1
∑
pi∈Π(T+u,∆0):pi(u)=d
pud
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v)
+
∑
T⊆S−u:|T |=|∆0|
∑
pi∈Π(T,∆0)
pud
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v)


2
·
[ρ(∆0)]−1(pud)
−1

 ∑
T⊆S:|T |=|∆0|
∑
pi∈Π(T,∆0)
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v)


−1
(1)
PROOF. At a high level, the conditional expectation of Ψ can be expressed as:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] =
∑
C∈C
Pr[X = C|XD(u) = d]Ψ(C).
We calculate Ψ for a configuration C by finding the relative weight of indistinguish-
able configurations in which u selects d. The adversary observes some subset of the
circuits. If we match the users to circuits in some way that sends users with observed
inputs to their own circuits, the result is an indistinguishable configuration. Similarly,
we can match circuits to destinations in any way that sends circuits on which the
output has been observed to their actual destination in C.
The value of Ψ(C) is especially simple if u’s input has been observed. If the output
has not also been observed, then Ψ(C) = pud . If the output has also been observed, then
Ψ(C) = 1.
For the case in which u’s input has not been observed, we have to take into account
the destinations of and observations on the other users. Let S ⊆ U be the set of users
s such that CI(s) = 0. Note that u ∈ S. Let ∆0 be the multiset of the destinations of
circuits in C on which the input has not been observed, but the output has.
Let f0(S,∆
0) be the probability that in a random configuration the set of unobserved
inputs is S and the set of observed destinations with no corresponding observed input
is ∆0:
f0(S,∆
0) = bn−|S|+|∆
0|(1 − b)2|S|−|∆0|[ρ(∆0)]−1
∑
T⊆S:|T |=|∆0|
∑
pi∈Π(T,∆0)
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v).
Let f1(S,∆
0) be the probability that in a random configuration the set of unobserved
inputs is S, the set of observed destinations with no corresponding observed input is
∆0, the output of u is observed, and the destination of u is d:
f1(S,∆
0) = bn−|S|+|∆
0|(1− b)2|S|−|∆0|[ρ(∆0)]−1pud ·∑
T⊆S−u:|T |=|∆0|−1
∑
pi∈Π(T+u,∆0):pi(u)=d
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v).
Let f2(S,∆
0) be the probability that in a random configuration the set of unobserved
inputs is S, the set of observed destinations with no corresponding observed input is
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∆0, the output of u is unobserved, and the destination of u is d:
f2(S,∆
0) = bn−|S|+|∆
0|(1− b)2|S|−|∆0|[ρ(∆0)]−1pud · ∑
T⊆S−u:|T |=|∆0|
∑
pi∈Π(T,∆0)
∏
v∈T
pvpi(v).
Now we can express the posterior probability Ψ(C) as:
Ψ(C) =
f1(S,∆
0) + f2(S,∆
0)
f0(S,∆0)
. (2)
The expectation of Ψ is a sum of the above posterior probabilities weighted by their
probability. The probability that the input of u has been observed but the output hasn’t
is b(1 − b). The probability that both the input and output of u have been observed is
b2. These cases are represented by the first two terms in Equation 1.
When the input of u has not been observed, we have an expression of the posterior
in terms of sets S and ∆0. The numerator (f1 + f2) of Equation 2 itself actually sums
the weight of every configuration that is consistent with S, ∆0, and the fact that the
destination of u is d. However, we must divide by pud , because we condition on the event{XD(u) = d}.
These observations give us the final summation in Equation 1.
3.1. Simple approximation of conditional expectation
The expression for the conditional expectation of Ψ in Equation 1 is difficult to inter-
pret. It would be nice if we could find a simple approximation. The probabilistic anal-
ysis in Syverson et al. [2000] proposes just such a simplification by reducing it to only
two cases: i) the adversary observes the user’s input and output and therefore iden-
tifies his destination, and ii) the adversary doesn’t observe these and cannot improve
his a priori knowledge. The corresponding simplified expression for the expection is:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] ≈ b2 + (1− b2)pud . (3)
This is a reasonable approximation if the final summation in Equation 1 is about
(1 − b)pud . This summation counts the case in which u’s input is not observed, and
to achieve a good approximation the adversary must experience no significant advan-
tage or disadvantage from comparing the users with unobserved inputs (S) with the
discovered destinations (∆0).
The quantity (1 − b)pud does provide a lower bound on the final summation. It may
seem obvious that considering the destinations in ∆0 can only improve the accuracy
of adversary’s prior guess about u’s destination. However, in some situations the pos-
terior probability for the correct destination may actually be smaller than the prior
probability. This may happen, for example, when some user v, v 6= u, communicates
with a destination e, e 6= d, and only u is a priori likely to communicate with e. If the
adversary observes the communication to e, it may infer that it is likely that u was
responsible and therefore didn’t choose d.
It is true, however, that in expectation this probability can only increase. Therefore
Equation 3 provides a lower bound on the anonymity metric.
The proof of this fact relies on the following lemma. Let E be an event in some finite
sample space Ω. Let A1, . . . ,An be a set of disjoint events such that E ⊆
⋃
iAi, and let
Aj = ⋃ji=1Ai. Let Ei = E ∩ Ai. Finally, let Y (ω) =∑i 1Ei(ω)Pr[Ei]/Pr[Ai] (where 1Ei is
the indicator function for Ei). Y (ω) is thus the conditional probability Pr[E|Ai], where
ω ∈ Ei.
LEMMA 3.2. Pr[E|An] ≤ E[Y |E ]
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PROOF.
Pr[E|An] = Pr[E]Pr[An]
=
(∑
i
Pr[Ei]
√
Pr[Ai]√
Pr[Ai]
)2
Pr[An]Pr[E] by a simple rewriting
≤
(√∑
i
(Pr[Ei])
2
Pr[Ai]
√∑
i
Pr[Ai]
)2
Pr[An]Pr[E] by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
=
∑
i
(Pr[Ei])2
Pr[Ai]Pr[E]
= E[Y |E ]
THEOREM 3.3. E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] ≥ b2 + (1− b2)pud
PROOF. As described in the proof of Theorem 3.1:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b2 + b(1− b)pud + (1− b)E[Ψ|XD(u) = d ∧XI(u) = 0].
To apply Lemma 3.2, take the set of configurations C to be the sample space Ω. Take
{XD(u) = d} to be the event E . Take the indistinguishability equivalence relation to
be the sets Ai. Finally, take Ψ to be Y . Then the lemma shows that E[Ψ|XD(u) =
d ∧XI(u) = 0] ≥ pud .
3.2. Worst-case Anonymity
To examine the accuracy of our approximation, we look at how large the final summa-
tion in Equation 1 can get as the users’ destination distributions vary. Because this
is the only term that varies with the other user distributions, this will also provide a
worst-case guarantee on expected anonymity metric. Our results will show that, in the
limit as the number of users grows, the worst case can occur when the users other than
u act as differently from u as possible by always visiting the destination u is otherwise
least likely to visit. Less obviously, we show that the limiting maximum can also occur
when the users other than u always visit d. This happens because it makes the adver-
sary observe destination d often, causing him to suspect that u chose d. Our results
also show that the worst-case expectation is about b + (1 − b)pud , which is significantly
worse than the simple approximation above.
As the first step in finding the maximum of Equation 1 over (pv)v 6=u, we observe that
it is obtained when every user v 6= u chooses only one destination dv, i.e. pvdv = 1 for
some dv ∈ ∆.
LEMMA 3.4. A maximum of E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] over (pv)v 6=u must occur when, for all
v 6= u, there exists some dv ∈ ∆ such that pvdv = 1.
PROOF. Take some user v 6= u and two destinations e, f ∈ ∆. Assign arbitrary prob-
abilities in pv to all destinations except for f , and let ζ = 1−∑δ 6=e,f pvδ . Then pvf = ζ−pve .
ConsiderE[Ψ|XD(u) = d] as a function of pve . The terms ti of Equation 1 that correspond
to any fixed S and ∆0 are of the following general form, where ci1, c
i
2, c
i
3, c
i
4, c
i
5, c
i
6 ≥ 0:
ti =
(ci1p
v
e + c
i
2(ζ − pve) + ci3)2
ci4p
v
e + c
i
5(ζ − pve) + ci6
.
This is a convex function of pve :
D2pve ti =
2(ci3(c
i
4 − ci5) + ci2(ci4ζ + ci6)− ci1(ci5ζ + ci6))2
(ci5(ζ − pve) + ci4pve + ci6)3
≥ 0.
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The leading two terms of E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] are constant in pv, and the sum of con-
vex functions is a convex function, so E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] is convex in pve . Therefore, a
maximum of E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] must occur when pve ∈ {0, 1}.
Order the destinations d = d1, . . . , d|∆| such that pudi ≥ pudi+1 for i > 1. The following
lemma shows that we can further restrict ourselves to distribution vectors in which,
for every user except u, the user either always chooses d or always chooses d|∆|.
LEMMA 3.5. A maximum of E[Ψ|XD(u) = d]must occur when, for all users v, either
pvd1 = 1 or p
v
d|∆|
= 1.
PROOF. Assume, following Lemma 3.4, that (pv)v 6=u is an extreme point of the set
of possible distribution vectors.
Equation 1 groups configurations first by the set S with unobserved inputs and sec-
ond by the observed destinations ∆0. Instead, group configurations first by S and sec-
ond by the set T ⊆ S with observed outputs. Because every user except u chooses a
destination deterministically, Ψ only depends on the sets S and T . Let Ψ1(S, T ) be this
value.
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+∑
S:u∈S
∑
T :T⊆S b
n−|S|+|T |(1− b)2|S|−|T |Ψ1(S, T ). (4)
Select two destinations di, dj , 1 < i < j. We break up the sum in Equation 4 and
show that, for every piece, the sum can only be increased by changing (pv)v so that any
user that always chooses di always chooses dj instead.
Fix S ⊆ U such that u ∈ S. Let Si, Sj ⊆ S be such that psdi = 1 if and only if s ∈ Si,
and psdj = 1 if and only if s ∈ Sj . Fix T ′ ⊆ S\Si\Sj and some t ≥ |T ′|.
Let f(S, T ′) be the sum of terms in Equation 4 that are indexed by S and some T
such that |T | = t and T ⊇ T ′. To calculate f(S, T ′), group its terms by the number tdi
of users v in T such that XD(v) = di. Let te be the number for these terms of users v in
T ′ such that XD(v) = e, e ∈ ∆\{di, dj}. The number tdj of users v such that XD(v) = dj
for these terms is then t −∑e∈∆−dj te. Let se be the number of users v in S − u such
that XD(v) = e. The number of terms in f(S, T
′) with a given tdi is then(
sdi
tdi
)(
sdj
tdj
)
.
For each of these terms, Ψ1 is the same. To calculate it, let fδ be the number of con-
figurations that yield the given S and (te)e∈∆ and are such that u’s output is observed
with destination δ:
fδ(tdi) =
(
sδ
tδ − 1
) ∏
e∈∆−δ
(
se
te
)
,
and let f0 be the number of configurations that yield the same S and (te)e∈∆ and are
such that u’s output is unobserved:
f0(tdi) =
∏
e∈∆
(
se
te
)
.
Then the posterior probability given S and (te)e∈∆ is
pud (fd(tdi) + f0(tdi))∑
δ∈∆ p
u
δ fδ(tdi) + f0(tdi)
.
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Therefore, letting m = t−∑e∈∆\{di,dj} te,
f(S, T ′) =bn−|S|+t(1− b)2|S|−t
m∑
tdi=0
(
sdi
tdi
)(
sdj
m− tdi
)
pud (fd(tdi) + f0(tdi))∑
δ∈∆ p
u
δ fδ(tdi) + f0(tdi)
.
The binomial coefficients of fδ and f0 in the numerator and denominator largely
cancel, and the whole expression can be simplified to
f(S, T ′) = α
m∑
tdi=0
(
sdi
tdi
)(
sdj
m− tdi
)
(sdi + 1− tdi)(sdj + 1−m+ tdi)
 pudi(sdi + 1)(sdj + 1−m+ tdi)+pudj (sdj + 1)(sdi + 1− tdi)+
(sdi + 1− tdi)(sdj + 1−m+ tdi)β


for some α, β ≥ 0.
This can be seen as the weighted convolution of binomial coefficients. Unfortunately,
there is no obvious way to simplify the expression any further to find the maximum as
we trade off sdi and sdj . There is a closed-form sum if the coefficient of the binomial
product is a fixed-degree polynomial, however. Looking at the coefficient, we can see
that it is concave.
ctdi =
(sdi+1−tdi )(sdj+1−m+tdi )
pu
di
(sdi+1)(sdj+1−m+tdi )+pudj (sdj+1)(sdi+1−tdi )+(sdi+1−tdi )(sdj+1−m+tdi )β
.
D2tdi
ctdi = −

 2((sdi + 1)(sdj + 1)(2 + sdi + sdj −m)2pudipudj+
b((sdi + 1)(sdj + 1 + tdi −m)3pudi + (sdj + 1)(sdi + 1− tdi)3pudj ))


((sdj+1+tdi−m)(b(sdi+1−tdi )+pudi (sdi+1))+(sdj+1)(sdi+1−tdi )p
u
dj
)3
≤ 0.
We can use this fact to bound the sum above by replacing ctdi with a line tangent at
some point i0. Call this approximation f˜ . Holding sdi+sdj constant, this approximation
is in fact equal at sdi = 0 because the sum has only one term. Then, if sdi = 0 still
maximizes the sum, the theorem is proved. Let c′i0 = Dtdi ctdi
∣∣
tdi=i0
.
f(S, T ′) ≤
m∑
tdi=0
(
sdi
tdi
)(
sdj
m− tdi
)
(c′i0(tdi − i0) + ci0)
=
(
sdi + sdj
m
)(
ci0 + c
′
i0
m · sdi
sdi + sdj
− c′i0 i0
)
= f˜(S, T ′).
The linear approximation will be done around the point i0 = m · sdi/(sdi + sdj). This
results in a simple form for the resulting approximation, and also the mass of the
product of binomial coefficients concentrates around this point. Set ν = sdi + sdj to
examine the tradeoff between sdi and sdj .
f˜(S, T ′) =
(
ν
m
)(
cm·sdi
ν
)
=
(
ν
m
)
((ν − sdi)(ν −m) + ν)((sdi + 1)ν −m · sdi)
 pudiν(sdi + 1)((ν − sdi)(ν −m) + ν)+pudjν(ν − sdi + 1)(ν + sdi(ν −m))+
β((sdi + 1)ν −m · sdi)((ν − sdi)(ν −m) + ν)


.
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Lemma A.1 in the Appendix shows that f˜ is convex in sdi . Thus, the maximum of f˜
must exist at sdi = 0 or sdi = ν. Observe that when sdi = 0,
f˜ =
(
ν
m
)
1−m+ ν
pdj(1 + ν) + β(1 −m+ ν) + pdi(1−m+ ν)
and when sdi = ν
f˜ =
(
ν
m
)
1−m+ ν
pdj (1−m+ ν) + β(1 −m+ ν) + pdi(1 + ν)
.
Therefore, because pdi ≥ pdj , f˜ is larger when sdi = 0. As stated, this implies that f
itself is maximized when sdi = 0.
Therefore, in looking for a maximum we can assume that every user except u either
always visits d or always visits d|∆|. To examine how anonymity varies with the num-
ber of users in each category, we derive an asymptotic estimate for large n. A focus
on large n is reasonable because anonymity networks, and onion routing in particular,
are understood to have the best chance at providing anonymity when they have many
users. Furthermore, Tor is currently used by an estimated 500,000 people.
Let α = {v 6= u : pvd = 1}/(n − 1) be the fraction of users that always visit d. The-
orem 3.6 gives an asymptotic estimate for the expected posterior probability given a
constant α. It shows that, in the limit, the maximum expected posterior probability is
obtained when all users but u always visit d or when they always visit d|∆|.
THEOREM 3.6. Assume that, for all v 6= u, either pvd = 1 or pvd|∆| = 1. Then, if α = 0,
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2 + (1 − b)
(
b+
(1 − b)2pud
1− b+ pud|∆|b
)
+O
(√
log(n)
n
)
,
if 0 < α < 1
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2 + (1 − b)
pud
1− b+ pudb+ pud|∆|b
+O
(√
log(n)
n
)
,
and, if α = 1,
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2 + (1− b)
pud
1− b+ pudb
+O
(√
log(n)
n
)
.
PROOF. Let ne = α(n−1) and nf = (1−α)(n−1). The expected posterior probability
can be given in the following variation on Equation 4:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2 + (1 − b)·
ne∑
e=0
(
ne
e
)
(1 − b)ebne−e
nf∑
f=0
(
nf
f
)
(1 − b)fbnf−f ·
f∑
j=0
(
f
j
)
bj(1− b)f−j
e∑
k=0
(
e
k
)
bk(1− b)e−k·
[bΨ2(e, f, j, k + 1) + (1− b)Ψ2(e, f, j, k)] .
(5)
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Here Ψ2(e, f, j, k) is the value of Ψ when the users with unobserved inputs consist of
u, e users v 6= u with pvd = 1, and f users v 6= u with pvd|∆| = 1; and the users with
unobserved inputs and observed outputs consist of k users v with XD(v) = d and j
users v with XD(v) = d|∆|. Given such a configuration, the number of indistinguish-
able configurations in which u has observed destination d is
(
e
k−1
)(
f
j
)
, the number of
indistinguishable configurations in which u has observed destination d|∆| is
(
e
k
)(
f
j−1
)
,
and the number of indistinguishable configuration in which u has an unobserved des-
tination is
(
e
k
)(
f
j
)
. Thus, we can express Ψ2 as
Ψ2(e, f, j, k) =
pud
(
e
k−1
)(
f
j
)
+ pud
(
e
k
)(
f
j
)
pud
(
e
k−1
)(
f
j
)
+ pud|∆|
(
e
k
)(
f
j−1
)
+
(
e
k
)(
f
j
) .
The binomial coefficients largely cancel, and so we can simplify this equation to
Ψ2(e, f, j, k) =
pud(e+ 1)(f − j + 1)
pudk(f − j + 1) + pud|∆|j(e− k + 1) + (e − k + 1)(f − j + 1)
.
We observe that j and k are binomially distributed. Therefore, by the Chernoff
bound, they concentrate around their means as e and f grow. Let µ1 = fb be the mean
of j and µ2 = eb be the mean of k. We can approximate the tails of the sums over j and
k in Equation 5 and sum only over the central terms:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+
(1− b)
ne∑
e=0
(
ne
e
)
(1− b)ebne−e
nf∑
f=0
(
nf
f
)
(1− b)fbnf−f ·
[
O (exp(−2c1)) +O (exp(−2c2))+
∑
j:|j−µ1|<
√
c1f
(
f
j
)
bj(1− b)f−j
∑
k:|k−µ2|<√c2e
(
e
k
)
bk(1− b)e−k·
(bΨ2(e, f, j, k + 1) + (1− b)Ψ2(e, f, j, k))
]
.
(6)
As j and k concentrate around their means, Ψ2 will approach its value at those
means. Let
ε1(j, k, u) = Ψ2(e, f, j, k + u)−Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u)
be the difference of Ψ2 from its value at µ1 and µ2+u, where u ∈ {0, 1} indicates if u’s
output is observed.
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Ψ2 is non-increasing in j and is non-decreasing in k:
DjΨ2 = −
(1 + e)(1 + f)(1 + e− k)pud|∆|pud(
(1 + f)(1 + e− k)pud|∆|+
(1 + f − j − u)(pud(e+ 1) + (1 − pud − pud|∆|)(1 + e− k))
)2
≤ 0.
DkΨ2 =
(1 + e)(1 + f − j)pud(pud|∆|(1 + f) + (1 − pud − pud|∆|)(1 + f − j))(
(1 + f)(1 + e− k − u)pud|∆|+
(1 + f − j)((1 + e)pud + (1 + e− k − u)(1− pud − pud|∆|))
)2
≥ 0.
Because the signs of these derivatives are constant, the magnitude of ε1 is largest
when j and k are as large or as small as possible. We can therefore bound the magni-
tude of ε1 with
max
σ∈{−1,1}
u∈{0,1}
(∣∣∣ε1 (µ1 + σ√c1f, µ2 + σ√c2e, u)∣∣∣)
= max
σ∈{−1,1}
u∈{0,1}
∣∣∣Ψ2(e, f, µ1 + σ√c1f, µ2 + σ√c2e+ u)−Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u)∣∣∣
= O
(√
c1/f
)
+O
(√
c2/e
)
,
where the second line follows from a simple expansion of Ψ2 according to Equation 3.2.
We use this estimate to approximate the value of Ψ2:
Ψ2(e, f, j, k + u) = Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u) + ε1(j, k, u)
= Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u) +O
(√
c1/f
)
+O
(√
c2/e
)
.
We set c1 = log(f)/4 and c2 = log(e)/4, and then Equation 6 becomes
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+
(1 − b)
ne∑
e=0
(
ne
e
)
(1− b)ebne−e
nf∑
f=0
(
nf
f
)
(1− b)fbnf−f ·
[
bΨ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + 1) + (1− b)Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2)+
O
(√
log(f)/f
)
+O
(√
log(e)/e
)]
.
(7)
e and f in this expression are binomially distributed. Let µ3 = ne(1− b) be the mean
of e and µ4 = nf (1 − b) be the mean of f . By applying the Chernoff bound to the sum
over e, setting the tails to start at min(b, 1− b)ne/2 from µ3, we can see that
ne∑
e=0
(
ne
e
)
(1− b)ebne−e
nf∑
f=0
(
nf
f
)
(1− b)fbnf−fO
(√
log(e)/e
)
= O
(√
log(ne)/ne
)
.
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We can similarly show that
ne∑
e=0
(
ne
e
)
(1 − b)ebne−e
nf∑
f=0
(
nf
f
)
(1− b)fbnf−fO
(√
log(f)/f
)
= O
(√
log(nf )/nf
)
.
For the remaining terms inside both sums, approximate the sums over e and f using
the Chernoff bound by setting the tails to be those terms more than
√
c3ne from µ3 and
more than
√
c4nf from µ4, respectively. This yields
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+
O
(
(log(ne)/ne)
−1/2
)
+O
(
(log(nf)/nf )
−1/2
)
+O
(
e−2c3
)
+O
(
e−2c4
)
+
(1− b)
∑
e:|e−µ3|<√c3ne
(
ne
e
)
(1− b)ebne−e
∑
f :|f−µ4|<√c4nf
(
nf
f
)
(1− b)fbnf−f ·
[bΨ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + 1) + (1− b)Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2)] .
(8)
As e and f concentrate around their means, Ψ2 will approach its value at those
means. Let
ε2(e, f, u) = Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u)−Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u)
be the difference of Ψ2 from its value at e = µ3 and f = µ4, u ∈ {0, 1}. Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2) in
non-decreasing with respect to e:
DeΨ2(e, f, µ1, µ2) =
(1 + (1− b)f)bpud((f + 1)(1− pud)− fb(1− pud − pud|∆|))
 (1 + (1 − b)f)(1 + (1− b)e)+(1 + (1 − b)f)(be)pud+
bf(1 + (1− b)e+ u)pud|∆|


2
≥ 0.
Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + 1) is non-increasing with respect to e:
DeΨ2(e, f, µ1, µ2) =
(1 + (1− b)f)(1− b)pud(fb(1− pud|∆| − pud)− (f + 1)(1− pud))
 ((1 − b)f)(1 + (1− b)e)+(1 + (1− b)f)(be+ 1)pud+
bf((1− b)e)pud|∆|


2
≤ 0.
Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u), u ∈ {0, 1}, is non-increasing with respect to f :
DfΨ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u) =
−b(1 + e)(1 + (1− b)e+ u)pudpud|∆|
 (1 + (1− b)f)(1 + (1 − b)e+ u)+(1 + (1− b)f)(be+ u)pud+
bf(1 + (1− b)e+ u)pud|∆|


2
≤ 0.
Therefore, the magnitude of ε2 is largest when e and f are as large or as small as
possible. We can therefore estimate the magnitude of ε2 with
max
σ∈{−1,1}
u∈{0,1}
(∣∣ε2 (µ3 + σ√c3ne, µ4 + σ√c4nf , u)∣∣) .
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If ne, nf 6= 0,
ε2
(
µ3 + σ
√
c3ne, µ4 + σ
√
c4nf , u
)
=Ψ2(µ3 + σ
√
c3ne, µ4 + σ
√
c4nf , µ1, µ2 + u)−
Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u)
=O
(√
c3/ne
)
+O
(√
c4/nf
)
.
If ne = 0, which occurs when α = 0,
ε2
(
0, µ4 + σ
√
c4nf , u
)
= Ψ2(0, µ4 + σ
√
c4nf , µ1, u)−Ψ2(0, µ4, µ1, u)
= O
(√
c4/nf
)
.
If nf = 0, which occurs when α = 1, the final term becomes
ε2 (µ3 + σ
√
c3ne, 0, u) = Ψ2(µ3 + σ
√
c3ne, 0, 0, µ2 + u)−Ψ2(µ3, 0, 0, µ2 + u)
= O
(√
c3/ne
)
.
These asymptotic estimates of ε2 follow from a simple expansion of Ψ2 according to
Equation 3.2.
We use them estimate to approximate the value of Ψ2 as e and f grow:
Ψ2(e, f, µ1, µ2 + u) = Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) + ε2(e, f, u)
= Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) +O
(√
c3/ne
)
+O
(√
c4/nf
)
.
We set c3 = log(ne)/4 and c4 = log(nf )/4, and then Equation 8 becomes
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b(1− b)pud + b2+
(1− b) [bΨ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + 1) + (1− b)Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2)] +
O
(
(log(ne)/ne)
−1/2
)
+O
(
(log(nf )/nf)
−1/2
)
.
(9)
Finally, we must estimate Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u), u ∈ {0, 1}. Assume that 0 < α < 1
and thus that ne = α(n− 1) and nf = (1− α)(n − 1) are both increasing with n. Then
Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) = Ψ2((1− b)ne, (1− b)nf , b(1− b)nf , b(1− b)ne + u)
=
pud(1− b)3nenf + c1ne + c2nf + c3(
((1− b)4 + pud(1− b)3b+ pud|∆|(1− b)3b)nenf+
c4ne + c5nf + c6
)
=
pud
1− b+ pudb+ pud|∆|b
+O(1/ne) +O(1/nf ) +O(1/(nenf )),
where c1, . . . , c6 are some values constant in ne and nf . When α = 0, then ne = 0, and
the estimate becomes
Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) = Ψ2(0, (1− b)nf , b(1− b)nf , u)
=
pud(1− b)nf + c1
((1− u)(1− b) + pudu(1− b) + pud|∆|(1 − u)b)nf + c2
=
pud(1− b)
((1− u)(1− b) + pudu(1− b) + pud|∆|(1 − u)b)
+O(1/nf ),
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where c1, c2 are some values constant in nf . When α = 1, then nf = 0, and the estimate
becomes
Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) = Ψ2((1 − b)ne, 0, 0, b(1− b)ne + u)
=
pudne + c1
((1− b) + pudb)ne + c2
=
pud
1− b+ pudb
+O(1/ne),
where c1, c2 are some values constant in ne.
Inserting these estimates for Ψ2(µ3, µ4, µ1, µ2 + u) into Equation 9 yields the theo-
rem.
It follows from this theorem that the worst case anonymity over user distributions
occurs either when all users always visit d|Delta| or when all users always visit d.
COROLLARY 3.7. limn→inf E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] is maximized either at α = 0 or at α = 1.
PROOF. The case α = 1 is larger in the limit than the case where 0 < α < 1, by
Thm. 3.6, because
pud
1− b+ pudb+ pud|∆|b
≤ p
u
d
1− b+ pudb
.
The case α = 1 is the worst case only when
pud|∆| ≥
(1− b)(1− pud)2
pud(1 + b)− b
.
This happens when pud ≥ 1/2 and pud|∆| is near 1 − pud . That is, if the user is likely to
visit d and the other users can’t distinguish themselves too much, then it is worst to
have them always visit d because the adversary will blame u.
However, we would expect pud|∆| to be small because it is at most 1/|∆|. In this case
the worst-case limiting distribution has α = 0, that is, it is worst when the other
users always act very different from u by visiting d|∆|. Then the expected assigned
probability is about b + (1 − b)pud . This is equal to the lower bound on the anonymity
metric when the adversary controls a fraction
√
b of the network.
4. TYPICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
It is unlikely that users of onion routing will ever find themselves in the worst-case sit-
uation. The necessary distributions just do not resemble what we expect user behavior
to be like in any realistic use of onion routing. Our worst-case analysis may therefore
be overly pessimistic. To get some insight into the anonymity that a typical user of
onion routing can expect, we consider a more realistic set of users’ destination distri-
butions in which each user selects a destination from a common Zipfian distribution.
This model of user behavior is used by Shmatikov andWang [2006] to analyze relation-
ship anonymity in mix networks and is motivated by observations that the popularity
of sites on the web follows a Zipfian distribution.
Let each user select his destination from a common Zipfian distribution p: pdi =
1/(µis), where s > 0 and µ =
∑|∆|
i=1 1/i
s. It turns out that the exact form of the distri-
bution doesn’t matter as much as the fact that it is common among users.
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THEOREM 4.1. When pv = pw, for all v, w ∈ U ,
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b2 + (1− b2)pud +O(1/n)
PROOF. Let p be the common destination distribution. The expected assigned prob-
ability can be expressed as:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] = b2 + b(1− b)pud+
(1− b)
n∑
s=1
bn−s(1− b)s−1
s∑
t=0
(1− b)s−tbt
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
·

(s− 1
t− 1
) ∑
∆∈Dt:∆1=d
t∏
i=2
p∆iΨ4(s,∆) +
(
s− 1
t
) ∑
∆∈Dt
t∏
i=1
p∆iΨ4(s,∆)

 . (10)
Here, s represents the size of the set of users with unobserved inputs, t represents
the size of the subset of those s users that also have observed outputs, ∆ represents
the t observed destinations, and Ψ4(s,∆) is the posterior probability. In this situation,
Ψ is unambiguous given s and ∆. Let ∆d = |{x ∈ ∆ : x = d}|. Ψ4 can be expressed
simply as:
Ψ4(s,∆) =
∆d(s− 1)|∆|−1 + pd(s− 1)|∆|
s|∆|
= (∆d + pd(s− t))/s.
The sum
∑
∆∈Dt:∆1=d
t∏
i=2
p∆iΨ4(s,∆)
in Equation 10 calculates the expectation forΨ4 conditioned on s and t. The expression
for Ψ4 shows that this expectation depends linearly on the expected value of ∆d. ∆d’s
expectation is simply 1+pd(t− 1), because one destination in this case is always d, and
each of the other t− 1 is d with probability pd. The sum
∑
∆∈Dt
t∏
i=1
p∆iΨ4(s,∆)
in Equation 10 similarly depends linearly on the expectation of ∆d, which in this case
is pdt.
With these observations, it is a straightforward calculation to show that the sum
over t in Equation 10 is simply
b
pd(s− 1) + 1
s
+ (1 − b)pd.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:24 Joan Feigenbaum et al.
We insert this into Equation 10 and simplify:
E[Ψ|XD(u) = d] =b2 + b(1− b)pud+
(1− b)
n∑
s=1
bn−s(1− b)s−1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)[
b
pd(s− 1) + 1
s
+ (1− b)pd
]
=b2 + b(1− b)pud+
(1− b)
[
b
(
pd +
(1 − pd)(1 − (1− b)n+1)
b(n+ 1)
)
+ (1− b)pd
]
=b2 + (1 − b2)pud + O(1/n).
Our results show that the expected value of the anonymity metric is close to b2+(1−
b2)pud for large populations. This amount matches the lower bound shown in Thm. 3.3.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We expect each user of an anonymity network to have a pattern of use. In order to
make guarantees to the user about his anonymity, we need to take this into account
when modeling and analyzing the system, especially in light of previous research that
indicates that an adversary can learn these usage patterns given enough time.
We perform such an analysis on onion routing. Onion routing is a successful design
used, in the form of the Tor system, by hundreds of thousands of people to protect their
security and privacy. But, because it was designed to be practical and because theory
in this area is still relatively young, the formal analysis of its privacy properties has
been limited.
We perform our analysis using a simple black-box model in the UC framework.
We justify this model by showing that it information-theoretically provides the same
anonymity as the onion routing protocol formalized by Feigenbaum et al. [2007]. Fur-
thermore, it should lend itself to the analysis of other anonymity protocols expressed
within the UC framework. We investigate the relationship anonymity of users and
their destinations in this model and measure it using the probability that the adver-
sary assigns to the correct destination of a given user after observing the network.
Our anonymity analysis first shows that a simple, standard approximation to the
expected value of the anonymity metric provides a lower bound on it. Then we consider
the worst-case set of user behaviors to give an upper bound on the expected value. We
show that, in the limit as the number of users grows, a user’s anonymity is worst
either when all other users choose destinations he is unlikely to visit, because that
user becomes unique and identifiable, or when that user chooses a destination that all
other users prefer, because the adversary mistakes the group’s choices for the user’s
choice. This worst-case anonymity with an adversary that controls a fraction b of the
routers is comparable to the best-case anonymity against an adversary that controls a
fraction
√
b.
The worst case is unlikely to be the case for any users; so we investigate anonymity
under a more reasonable model of user behavior suggested in the literature. In it, users
select destinations from a common Zipfian distribution. Our results show that, in this
case and in any case with a common distribution, the expected anonymity tends to the
best possible, i.e. the adversary doesn’t usually gain that much knowledge from the
other users’ actions.
Future work includes extending this analysis to other types of anonymity (such
as sender anonymity), extending it to other anonymity networks, and learning more
about the belief distribution of the adversary than just its mean. A big piece of the
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attack we describe is in learning the users’ destination distribution, about which only
a small amount of research, usually on simple models, has been done. The speed with
which an adversary can perform this stage of the attack is crucial in determining the
validity of our attack model and results.
In response to analyses such as that of Øverlier and Syverson [2006], the current
Tor design includes entry guards by default for all circuits. Roughly, this means that,
since about January 2006, each Tor client selects its first onion router from a small set
of nodes that it randomly selects at initialization. The rationale is that communication
patterns of individuals are what need to be protected. If an entry guard is compro-
mised, then the percentage of compromised circuits from that user is much higher.
But, without entry guards, it appears that whom that user communicates with and
even at what rate can be fairly quickly learned by an adversary owning a modest per-
centage of the Tor nodes anyway. If no entry guard is compromised, then no circuits
from that user will ever be linked to him. However, if a user expects to be targeted
by a network adversary that can control nodes, he can expect his entry guards ulti-
mately to be attacked and possibly compromised. If the destinations he chooses that
are most sensitive are rarely contacted, he may thus be better off choosing first nodes
at random. How can we know which is better? Extending our analysis to include entry
guards will allow us to answer or at least further illuminate this question.
Our model also assumes that client connections to the network are such that the
initial onion router in a circuit can tell that it is initial for that circuit. This is true
for the overwhelming majority of traffic on the Tor network today, because most users
run clients that are not also onion routers. However, for circuits that are initiated
at a node that runs an onion router, a first node cannot easily tell whether it is the
first node or the second—without resorting to other attacks of unknown efficacy, e.g.,
monitoring latency of traffic moving in each direction in response to traffic moving
in the other direction. Thus, that initiating edge of the black box is essentially fuzzy.
Indeed, this was originally the only intended configuration of onion routing for this
reason [Goldschlag et al. 1996]. The addition of clients that do not also function as
routers was a later innovation that was added to increase usability and flexibility
[Reed et al. 1998; Syverson et al. 2000]. Similarly, peer-to-peer designs such as Crowds
[Reiter and Rubin 1998] and Tarzan [Freedman and Morris 2002] derive their security
evenmore strongly from the inability of the first node to know whether it is first or not.
Thus, extending our model and analysis to this case will make it still more broadly ap-
plicable.
A. APPENDIX
Let f˜ be as defined in Lemma 3.5.
LEMMA A.1. D2sdi
f˜ ≥ 0.
PROOF. Let i = sdi and µ = ν −m for simplicity. Then
f˜ =
(ν + iµ)(ν + (ν − i)µ)
pudjν(ν + iµ)(1 − i+ ν) + (1 + i)pudiν(ν − iµ+ νµ) + β(ν + iµ)(ν − iµ+ νµ)
.
The second derivative of f˜ can be expressed as
D2sdi
f˜ =
N
D
,
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where
N =−
(
(2(i+ j)(−i− j + µ)(
−i3(pudi − pudj)µ3((i+ j)(pudi + pudj ) + βµ)+
3i2(i+ j)µ2(pudi + p
u
dj + p
u
diµ)((i + j)(p
u
di + p
u
dj ) + βµ)−
3i(i+ j)2µ((i + j)(pudi + p
u
dj) + βµ)
(
−pudj + pudi(1 + µ)2
)
+
(i + j)3
(
(i + j)(pudi)
2(1 + µ)3 + pudj((i + j)p
u
dj + βµ)+
pudi
(
βµ(1 + µ)3 + pudj(2 + µ)
(−i− j + 2µ+ (1 + i+ j)µ2)))))
and
D =
(
(i+ j)2(pudi + ip
u
di + p
u
dj + jp
u
dj + β)+
(i+ j)(i(pudj + β) + j(p
u
di + ip
u
di + ip
u
dj + β))µ+ ijβµ
2
)3
,
substituting (i + j) for ν. D is clearly positive. Therefore we must just show that N is
non-negative.
We collect terms in N by the coefficients pdi , pdj , and β:
2pdjβ(i + j)(i + j − µ)µ(i + j + iµ)3+
2pdiβ(i+ j)(i + j − µ)µ(i + j + jµ)3+
2(pudj )
2(i+ j)2(i+ j − µ)(i+ j + iµ)3+
2(pudi)
2(i + j)2(i + j − µ)(i + j + jµ)3+
2pudip
u
dj(i+ j)
2(i+ j − µ)(i+ j)(2 + µ)·(
i2
(−1 + µ2)+ j (µ(2 + µ) + j (−1 + µ2))+ i (µ(2 + µ)− j (2 + µ2))) .
The coefficients of the terms in pdi and pdj are clearly positive because i + j = ν ≥
ν −m = µ.
If we collect the remaining terms by i and j, we get
i3
(
(pudi)
2 + (pudj )
2(1 + µ)3 + pudip
u
dj
(−2− µ+ 2µ2 + µ3))+
j3
(
(pudj )
2 + (pudi)
2(1 + µ)3 + pudip
u
dj
(−2− µ+ 2µ2 + µ3))+
i2pudip
u
djµ(2 + µ)
2+
j2pudip
u
djµ(2 + µ)
2+
2ijpudip
u
djµ(2 + µ)
2+
3i2j
(
(pudi)
2(1 + µ) + (pudj )
2(1 + µ)2 − pudipudj (2 + µ)
)
+
3ij2
(
(pudj )
2(1 + µ) + (pudi)
2(1 + µ)2 − pudipudj (2 + µ)
)
.
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The coefficients for the i3 and j3 terms are clearly non-negative when µ ≥ 1. When
µ = 0, observe that the coefficients become (pudi − pudj )2 ≥ 0. The coefficients for the i2,
j2, and ij terms are also clearly non-negative.
To show that the i2j term is non-negative, we use the fact that pdi and pdj are prob-
abilities that sum to at most one. Let pdj = ζ−pdi, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1. Then the coefficient of i2j
becomes a quadratic function of pdi with positive second derivative. Its minimum is at
pdi =
4ζ + 5ζµ+ 2ζµ2
2(2 + µ)2
.
The coefficient evaluated at this point is
ζ2µ
(
8 + 11µ+ 4µ2
)
4(2 + µ)2
,
which is non-negative. Therefore, the whole i2j term is non-negative.
Similarly, for the ij2 term, we look at its coefficient as a function of pdi with pdj =
ζ − pdi . It is also a quadratic function with positive second derivative. Its minimum is
found at
4ζ + 3ζµ
2(2 + µ)2
.
The coefficient evaluated at this point is
ζ2µ(8 + µ(11 + 4µ))
4(2 + µ)2
,
which is non-negative. Therefore, the whole ij2 term is non-negative. This implies that
N is non-negative, and thus that D2sdi
f˜ is non-negative.
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